ANGELS OF MERCY? THE LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT BY NURSES IN ENGLAND AND WALES
In circumstances where life sustaining treatment appears merely to be drawing out the inevitable, English law 1 does not allow the life of a patient to be actively brought to an end. However, death by omission is allowable in these circumstances and it is usual practice for agreement to be sought between the healthcare team and a patient or their immediate family to withdraw aggressive life sustaining measures such as mechanical ventilation or vasoactive drugs 2 . It is highly unusual for withdrawal to take place without the agreement of all these parties, and it is often possible to time withdrawal so relatives and religious representatives can be near. In practice withdrawal is as simple as removing an endotracheal tube and turning off an infusion pump and this can be performed by any member of the healthcare team, be it a consultant, a junior doctor, or a nurse. The choice may be dictated by family wishes, the skill levels of staff or how busy the intensive care unit (ICU) is. The identity of this professional is not free of implications, yet where it is a nurse these implications have thus far not been explored. It is on the legal and professional implications of nurses undertaking the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment that this paper is focused. I shall hereafter refer to this act as withdrawal of treatment and, where it is undertaken by a nurse, nurse actioned withdrawal of treatment.
Due to the highly emotive nature of withdrawal of treatment there are multiple pitfalls that may make staff performing these duties vulnerable to complaints and perhaps legal action. Family members may not fully accept the inevitability of the death of a loved one and change their minds at key stages of the process. After withdrawal, the dying process may last for several days 3 during which patients may experience symptoms that distress witnessing family members, such as agonal 1 While Scottish and Northern Irish law is largely similar in this area, in preparing this paper I have not examined the possibility of separate approaches in other countries in the United Kingdom. breathing, a reflexive gasping. Further complaints may arise from members of the healthcare team who disagree with the clinical path taken. 4 Depending on the nature and forum of a complaint, nurses may find themselves defending their activities against civil action or criminal prosecution, and, because of differences in professional and legal standards, whatever the outcome of such an action, they would also face the scrutiny of the nursing regulator, the Nursing and Midwifery council (NMC), as well as a local disciplinary tribunal.
While the Mental Capacity Act 2005 explicitly considers withdrawal of treatment in section 4 (5), this consideration is not comprehensive. It is within common law that we find doctors named as the professionals with a special dispensation to legally bring about death. In Bland 5 Lord Goff suggests:
I also agree that the doctor's conduct is to be differentiated from that of, for example, an interloper who maliciously switches off a life support machine because, although the interloper may perform exactly the same act as the doctor who discontinues life support, his doing so constitutes interference with the lifeprolonging treatment then being administered by the doctor. 6
While doctors have several defences under common law to the charge of murder 7 and allegations of malpractice, this paper discusses the criminal, civil and professional defensibility of nurses undertaking this role. In the absence of a specific body of law related to nurse actioned withdrawal I shall discuss the probable legal and professional responses by considering parallel cases. Examining some of the circumstances in which doctors are allowed undertake activities that result in a death, 8 I argue that the unique dispensation by which doctors are legally permitted to perform these tasks rests largely on their identity as doctors rather than any distinctive feature of their activities themselves, which in the case of withdrawal have been classed as 4 I think particularly of the complaint brought against the paediatrician Leonard Arthur, and described at length in: MJ Gunn, JC Smith, 'Arthur's case and the right to life of a Down's syndrome child' Crim.L.R. (1985) 705-715. 5 Op. Cit., n. 5 6 Ibid., at 866. 7 J Herring, 'Dying and Death,' in Medical Law and Ethics (2006) 405-491. 8 I acknowledge this wording is controversial, but use it descriptively, in order to clearly contrast the legality of such activities when undertaken by doctors with the illegality of their being undertaken by others, as the status of nurses can begin to be clarified by their identity in this instance. I do not use it lightly or wish to imply the type of value judgement that conventional formulations such as 'withdrawal' have been constructed to avoid. Similar caveats apply to my discussion of termination of pregnancy. manslaughter or assisted suicide in similar cases involving members of the public. 9 This uniqueness of doctors in the eyes of the law means that, while it is tempting to think of medical law for nurses as indistinct from that for doctors, in reality it follows the quite separate principles of vicarious liability. While these principles may nevertheless avoid classing nurses (and presumably others acting in a similar capacity) as Lord Goff's "interlopers", 10 it depends not, like medicine, on a judicial recognition of the difficult realities inherent in healthcare provision, but instead upon a judicial view that nurses are instruments of doctors with scant capacity for independent activity. While nurses may thus have practical exemption from the legal consequences of their actions so long as they were acting on the orders of a doctor, this judicial position puts them at odds with their professional responsibilities, which envisage nurses as independent professionals who are to be held liable for their own actions. This fracture between judicial and professional expectation creates the possibility of nurses being legally exonerated but professionally censured -a possibility made all the more immediate by the multiple, sometimes conflicting, layers of regulatory and managerial expectations of the scope of nursing practice which can produce strict judgements against individual practitioners. The privations of dismissal or deregistration are not slight, and a harmonisation of judicial and regulatory views is urgently needed to remove such jeopardy from nurses carrying out ethically and professionally legitimate duties.
I. MEDICAL TERMINATION OF LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT
It is tempting to interpret medical law for nurses as indistinct from that which governs doctors; indeed some writers appear to do just that. 11 As the law permits doctors to undertake activities that result in a death in distinct situations, such a hypothesis would imagine similar legal protections belonged to nurses. Yet I suggest such a hypothesis is incorrect, as nurses are governed by quite distinct legal 9 Note however that identity as a doctor alone is not a defence in itself: R. v Cox [1992] (unreported) concerned a doctor who was convicted of attempted murder after hastening a patient's death, is a good example. In that case, features that would have allowed Dr Cox to use the doctrine of double effect as a defence were missing, resulting in his conviction-although he was treated leniently. Given the degree to which the facts of the case transgress the Director of Public Prosecution's 2010 guidance on prosecuting assisted suicide, it is likely his treatment would be less lenient today. (See Crown Prosecution Service 'DPP publishes assisted suicide policy' (2010) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/109_10/> accessed 5 September 2011). 10 Op. Cit., n. daughter, a severely brain damaged 14 month old, for acts analogous to those of a withdrawing doctor. The daughter, Abigail, was so brain damaged she was unable to breathe without help 30 and had already been subject to a not for resuscitation order. 31,32 After leaving her bedside for a few minutes, Abigail's mother claimed to have returned to find Abigail's tracheostomy tube out of her neck; despite shouting for help Abigail died soon afterwards. The crown prosecution service obtained a successful conviction on the basis that Abigail's mother had in fact removed the tube before leaving the bedside. She was convicted by the jury and given an eighteen month suspended jail sentence for Abigail's manslaughter. Although the conviction was eventually quashed on appeal, it was due to a legal technicality.
In the second case a grandson tried to disconnect life sustaining equipment from his grandmother. 33 Shara Karapetian, described by the judge as "devoted" to his grandmother, barricaded himself in the side-room where she was being treated and switched off machines, before cutting her intravenous drug line with scissors. Again the close resemblance of these actions to those of a withdrawing doctor did not prevent a suspended sentence for attempted murder being imposed, the judge describing it as a bizarre attempt at mercy killing.
In his examination of these cases, Huxtable 34 suggests that it is neither the interests of the patient nor the actions of the withdrawer that allow withdrawal to legally take place, but instead the identity of the withdrawer as a doctor. In such a way these detailed in the Mental Capacity Act. 37 It is perhaps as part of this process of the exercise of properly constituted authority, that we begin to see the place of nurse actioned withdrawal begin to emerge.
Are Nurses Lord Goff's Interlopers?
We 38 37 This need for medical arbitration of best interests is underlined by the process by which those competent to judge their own best interests can refuse life sustaining treatment. In this case the principle of autonomy takes a central role by dictating that the individual is the one best placed to determine their interests. Yet in this central role autonomy contends with the notion capacity, that is, whether an individual is competent to make such a determination of their interests for themselves. It is in this need for collaboration of mental competence that the doctors professional role in both confirming capacity, and in informing the determination of best interests that arises from it, is quite unique from members of the public, however closely they know the individual and however allied to that individuals interests they may appear. Indeed, where a doctor's duty of care may allow them to omit to act, the duty of a family member may be such that passivity in the face of attempts to end life may be viewed as a sort of active assistance and thus potentially open to charges of assisting suicide. See Huxtable's contrast of legal treatment of passive assistance of suicide by doctors and family members in R Huxtable, 'Assisted Suicide in 'the shadowy area of mercy killing'', in Euthanasia, ethics and the law: from conflict to compromise, Op heard from distraught relatives searching for someone to hold accountable for the tragedy they are experiencing. Of course, such risks must not be overplayed as they are ever present within healthcare practice, but with unclear legal and professional attitudes to the practice of nurse actioned withdrawal, the delicate balance between clinical necessity and the everyday risk of litigation is disturbed. The bringing of a civil action, even one that fails in the courts, would precipitate an investigation by the both the hospital authorities and the nursing regulator where a nurse would need to defend their actions according to quite different standards to those that apply in law, and censure could have shattering effects on a nurse's career.
We have seen that the law governing withdrawal of treatment uses a complex formula to protect Doctors from legal repercussions of their actions, and that this protection does not extend to members of the public even when they undertake analogous acts. The case of John Lovell suggests nurses may somehow be protected by the law yet does not explain why such a position is so. In the next section I shall look at legal and professional treatments of Nurses and argue that both the law and the professional regulator have simplified views of the role of the nurse, suggesting nurse actioned withdrawal may have unpredictable results. It seems to be a reasonable assumption that, if the nurse had multidisciplinary support, a judge would view their case sympathetically, perhaps using their ability to weave a defence in the nurse's favour. We should note, however, that in both the Watts 41 and the Karapetian 42 cases the judge showed considerable sympathy to the defendant, handing down short, noncustodial sentences in both cases. Judicial sympathy may therefore result in lenient treatment rather than exemption. Even in scenarios where a nurse is found neither guilty or liable (depending on the type of action) in law, they face the additional hurdles of a managerial structure that may not accept (or understand) their role and a nursing regulator mandated to protect the public. Depending on the regulator's perceptions of public protection, a nurse may still be subject to harsh penalties for their part in the act of withdrawal; this double jeopardy will also be examined more closely below.
II. NURSES AS WITHDRAWERS -LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL

POSSIBILITIES
In this section I shall examine the legal and professional consequences of nurse actioned withdrawal of treatment. As no cases exist it will be necessary to reflect on the treatment of nurses in other scenarios, although the virtual invisibility of the nursing profession from the law makes the task of deciding legal consequences more arduous. I examine the approaches to nursing that exist under the current law and suggest that, by viewing nursing duties as an extension of medical acts (or omissions), the law gives sufficient leeway for a nurse to escape liability for an act of withdrawal that can be demonstrated to be under the control of a doctor. In 1994, Valerie Tomlinson, a theatre sister of 30 years experience was reported by a colleague for conducting three parts of an appendectomy while supervised by a surgeon with whom she had "a mutual trust and understanding", Mr Bhatti. Both she and the surgeon were suspended but reinstated with a final written warning following a disciplinary hearing at the NHS trust. 44, 45 Meanwhile, a hospital sister at a geriatric day unit who followed the instructions of her consultant and surreptitiously tranquillised an aggressive patient who was refusing compulsory admission to the wards for deteriorating mental health was reported by a colleague and suspended from duty. At her disciplinary tribunal she was given a final written warning and told she had only narrowly escaped dismissal, meanwhile a disciplinary inquiry exonerated the consultant of professional misconduct. The disciplinary penalties for both nurses were the same, implying that the counsels were at fault in their arguments that obeying doctor's orders is a credible defence -yet I suggest in the next section that their comment was well founded in case law, an assertion reinforced by the judgment the Lords delivered in RCN v DHSS 47 after hearing the counsel's arguments. 48 Furthermore, in both the cases above it is notable that no illegal act was alleged. In the light of this, the legal and regulatory context of with the national guidelines available at the time for covert administration of medicines, 52,53 which, while suggesting that covert administration is far from ideal practice, accept that in a patient lacking capacity it may be undertaken if it is in their best interests. 47 Op. Cit., n.16 48 Which, as stated in the previous section, suggested that references to doctors in the Abortion Act recognised a team effort. I will return to the case later.
49 L Hunt, 'For doctor, read nurse' The Independent (London, January 27 1995). 50 While the National Association of Theatre Nurses produced guidelines that emphasised the importance of training for nurses who are to act as first assistants to surgeons in the operating theatre, this role was constructed for specific procedures and did not include activities such as Sister 
Nurses in the law
There are few cases where the judiciary specifically addresses the role of nurses, and even more rarely does the role of the nurse form the ratio dicidendi. The position of nursing as an ancillary profession to medicine means that many judgments simply do not address nurses at all, even when they are central to the case at hand. 54 Chiarella suggests this invisibility is partly based on judicial ignorance of the work nurses perform, which is characterised as mundane, domestic, and, when not directly replacing a medical role, unskilled. 55 Certainly in the three cases examined, all of which concern nurses' liability for their actions, the law advances a view that nurses' primary duties are to doctors, rather than patients, a standpoint that is at variance to the nursing code of professional practice. 56 Nurses' professional responsibilities are set out in "The code: Standards of conduct, performance and ethics for nurses and midwives", published by the The Nursing and Midwifery Council. The code contains 61points, the first 20 of which explicitly detail nurses' duties toward those in their care, while points 21-34 detail duties toward colleagues. The code apparently envisages interprofessional relationships within healthcare as collegial rather than hierarchical in form. As shall be explained in more detail later, the statement that particularly seems to contradict the legal position is found on the opening page of the code: "As a professional, you are personally accountable for actions and omissions in your practice, and must always be able to justify your decisions. The law in this area seems to leave the question of nurses' actions to the supervising doctor, perhaps even to the extent of mitigating a negligent act that the nurse performs on the doctor's behalf. Here we have a solid basis on which to suggest the law would defend nurse actioned withdrawal. There is further reason to suspect this when we consider that judges (with an eye to public policy) may surmise it is not in the public interest to criminalise nurses, and therefore extend the special treatment allowed to doctors to nurses actions as well. Yet there are important caveats to this conclusion;
vicarious liability does not operate in criminal law, and so could not form a specific defence against criminal charges, only civil ones. Furthermore, this argument is based largely on obiter dicta and therefore does not have binding authority on future cases.
As I shall argue below, it is not rational to say that nurses have no responsibility to patients except through a doctor, indeed, such judicial assumptions apparently contradict statutory moves to promote whistle-blowing under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, opening these judgments to accusations of irrational law.
Even within civil law the defence of vicarious liability is questionable. Past tendencies to permit medical practice to operate in a rarefied, self referential atmosphere, exemplified by the use of the Bolam 68 test to justify apparently irrational practices have given way to a less deferential approach to medical conduct. 69, 70 Judgments such as Bolitho 71 (where the Lords ruled that medical opinion must have a logical basis) show an increasing desire among the judiciary to root out irrational assumptions that underlie medical law, and nurses would be well advised to arm themselves with more justification than the law provides before defending nurse actioned withdrawal in a court, and it is to ethical and practical justifications that I suggest they turn.
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Negligence and complications in end of life care
immediately apparent how this might take place given the usual close involvement of the family in agreeing withdrawal of treatment (especially from incompetent patients).
While agreement is generally sought between relatives and the healthcare team before withdrawal, it is possible that withdrawal of treatment might still be subject to post hoc accusations of negligence by a family. There are clear circumstances where such accusations may occur when ventilatory support is withdrawn: Agonal breathing, an apparently distressing, pre-terminal gasping caused by very high levels of carbon dioxide in the blood has been noted to last up to 40 minutes in adults, 74 while in infants it can last considerably longer: 31 hours in one study. 75 Relatives may be unprepared for such events and may feel their loved one has been robbed of the dignity that withdrawal was intended to preserve, so that while the death itself may be agreed upon, the actual management might form the source of considerable dissatisfaction to a significant minority (as was the case with 8% of interviewees in the study above). 76 A further complexity is introduced by the differentiation of such breathing from dyspnoea, an acute and agonising inability to breathe adequately, that, unlike agonal breathing, is associated with conscious suffering in the patient, and is treatable (in the context of terminal care) with increased doses of sedation. The existence of such a differential diagnosis at least opens the door for queries of negligence. Should such claims be advanced against a nurse it is questionable if the courts would accept a bald defence of 'doctors' orders' without comment.
Such risks also raise pressing questions of a fracture between law and clinical practice suggested by legal arguments that the nurse may perform a negligent act at the behest of the doctor and escape responsibility. This seems to indicate a limitation in the duty of care owed to the patient, creating a fundamental inconsistency with nursing's code of professional practice, which declares: "As a professional, you are personally accountable for actions and omissions in your practice and must always be able to justify your decisions".
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In turn this creates potentially disastrous consequences for nurses who, due to formal complaints or civil actions, are called on by their registering body to justify their actions, scrutiny that will take place regardless of any legal outcome. The inherently unpredictable nature of dying, and the highly charged atmosphere of the death of a loved one, makes such situations a possibility and one has only to look the complications of terminal care to see how such complaints might arise. It is to these considerations we shall now turn.
A regulator with teeth -The Nursing and Midwifery Council
Blurred roles and ambiguous distinctions between spheres of practice are a fact of nursing life, particularly in areas such as hospital nursing where doctors and nurses work closely together. As the law correctly observes, such healthcare is a team activity, and a loyalty to that team will often lead a nurse to set aside feelings of professional vulnerability if doing so will expedite the process of care and deliver perceived benefits to the patient. In so doing they may assume their activities will be vouched for by the doctor in charge, and that, provided they acted in good faith, they Margaret Haywood threw the severe nature of NMC discipline into the public consciousness. 94 Haywood, an experienced nurse, tried unsuccessfully to raise concerns about patient maltreatment within the ward where she worked. In frustration she contacted a television company and secretly filmed this maltreatment, which was then broadcast in a television documentary. After a complaint to the NMC from the hospital trust where the abuse took place, Haywood was removed from the nursing register for breaching patient confidentiality (on the basis that consent for filming had been obtained from patients after footage had been scrutinised by the production team). There was outcry and her punishment was eventually downgraded after a public campaign 95 . Naturally the NMC may defend such decisions as necessarily firm on the basis of upholding the trustworthiness of the profession or protecting patient
safety, yet such sentiments seem significantly at odds with their conduct in this case.
But would the NMC remove a nurse from the register for following doctor's orders?
Cases of deregistration for following doctors' orders are rare -perhaps because it is rarely advanced as a defence given the explicit advice of influential commentators such as Dimond. 96 However, such cases do exist. Rosser 97 reports a case where a senior midwife was held responsible for a stillbirth that resulted from the administration of medication to speed up a slow labour. As the medication had recognised risks to the fetus, the midwife followed protocol and summoned the registrar when the fetal heartbeat showed signs of distress. When the registrar made no instruction to change the management, the midwife continued with the medication and the baby was subsequently delivered stillborn. The professional conduct committee of the UKCC, ruled that following doctors orders was not a defence as the midwife was personally accountable for the care she gave and removed her from the register. Of course, such examples do not exactly match the circumstances of nurse actioned withdrawal, however, even without such concrete examples, the existence of differing legal and professional expectations represents a disquieting paradox for practicing nurses, especially given that nurse actioned withdrawal of treatment results in the death of a patient and may cause significant distress to the patient's family.
Whilst it is important to maintain perspective on the risks of deregistration -only 0.2% of nurses ever have contact with the NMC over fitness to practice issues 98 and many cases of deregistration are for infractions that are clearly unacceptable -the lack of clear guidelines from a regulator known for their strict attitudes, whose judgement of nursing practice may be coloured by its proportion of lay members, suggests nurses may risk their careers by undertaking legitimate activities. Of course, the legal system makes it share of mistakes and has shameful and disproportionate verdicts in its history, yet as judges are loath to overturn the verdicts of professional bodies 99,100 faulty verdicts are simply referred back to the NMC for reconsideration; the lack oversight may create a concerning lack of responsiveness to the very real privations deregistration creates. 101 The disjuncture between legal and professional attitudes appears to make the risk of Meanwhile nursing leaders have sought to define nurses as autonomous agents with scant regard to the actualities of healthcare delivery. These professional and legal half truths have built a fragile edifice that creaks uncomfortably under the weight of everyday reality. Should the price of these contradictions be an injustice done to the legitimate activities of nurses?
